Proceeding from characteristic of mbo , this thesis cites the relevant theories of mbo and analyses the extra cost to modern enterprises caused by the separation of ownership and management . and with the relevant mathematics model , the author proposes lowest agency cost occurs only when managers " income totally depend on enterprise surplus through institutional arrangement 本文从mbo的特点出发，结合mbo的相关理论，分析了所有权与经营权分离给现代企业带来的额外成本，并根据相关的数学模型提出只有当制度安排使经营者收入的高低完全依赖于企业剩余时，才能使企业的代理成本最低。
It affect on the fowling put forward the chinese private enterprise property right relationship " s problem . between this problem , the property right of individual owner enterprise is clearest . but the problem of it " s property right is singleness and close ; partner ship enterprise achieve diversification of property right in a certain extent compare with individual owner enterprise 其中个人业主企业的产权最为清晰，但产权存在严重的单一性和封闭性；合伙企业较个人业主企业一定程度上实现了产权多元化，初始产权也是明确的，但在发展过程中产生了产权不清晰的问题；股份制企业从某种意义上说产权是清晰的，但由于股份化要求所有权与经营权分离，产生了委托?代理问题。
This kind of interest conflicts takes on the traits such as objectivity , the possibility of fund damage , complexity , diversity and concealment , etc . in practice , the indirect interest conflicts that the fund manager and custodian ’ s affiliated persons engage in transactions are far more usual than the direct interest conflicts that they participate in the deals themselves 基金财产所有权与经营权分离导致投资者与基金管理人、托管人之间形成的委托?代理关系是基金利益冲突形成的根本原因;基金管理人、托管人违背了对投资者的忠实义务是对基金利益冲突进行法律规制的法理基础。
Shore holders " meeting has be come a mere formality , while the board of derides has centralized , at the same time , share holder becomes a outsider of the corporate , and he not only ca n ' t make decisions about corporate ' s more serious after the managers " revolution , defect corporate governance is the base of the securities market in china 公司治理问题缘于所有权与经营权分离带来的“经营层的内部控制” 。在近现代公司的发展趋势中，股东大会“形骸化” 、董事会“中心化”是其突出表现，股东会股东成为公司的外部人，它们既不能对公司的重大事务进行决策，又不能对董事会进行有效的监督。
Because in modern corporate there is the separation of ownership and managing rights , the right of controlling belongs to the board . in order to control indirectly the company , shareholders must gain more information of management , which is the very important link to protect the rights of shareholders on all sides . sharerholds " rights of knowing include the rights of consulting the accounts , the rights of consulting the books , the rights of inquiry 由于公司制奉行所有权与经营权分离原则，大多数股东并不直接参与公司的经营管理，公司的日常经营和决策大多掌握在董事会和经理层手中，因而，在控制公司和制订公司经营决策的过程中大多数股东常常陷于信息不对称的弱势地位，造成股东权利的保护犹如水中之月。
