不可观测的英文

• unobservable

• "观测"英文翻译    observe; observation; viewin ...
• "不可观测量" 英文翻译 :    unobservable quantity
• "不可观测 未观察到的" 英文翻译 :    unobservable
• "不可观测的随变数" 英文翻译 :    unobservable random disturbances
• "不可观测子空间" 英文翻译 :    unobservable subspace
• "不可观测的随的机因子" 英文翻译 :    unobservable chance factor
• "不可观测的随机变量" 英文翻译 :    unobservable random variable
• "不可观测的随机扰动" 英文翻译 :    unobservable random disturbance
• "可观测变量" 英文翻译 :    observable variable
• "可观测得的" 英文翻译 :    perceptible
• "可观测的" 英文翻译 :    observable
• "可观测的量" 英文翻译 :    observable quantity
• "可观测分量" 英文翻译 :    observable component
• "可观测曲面" 英文翻译 :    observable surface
• "可观测条件" 英文翻译 :    observable condition
• "可观测信息" 英文翻译 :    observable information
• "可观测性" 英文翻译 :    observability
• "可观测宇宙" 英文翻译 :    observable universe
• "可观测指数" 英文翻译 :    observability index
• "结构可观测性" 英文翻译 :    structural observability
• "可观测规范型" 英文翻译 :    observable canonical form
• "可观测相伴型" 英文翻译 :    observable companion form
• "可观测子空间" 英文翻译 :    observable subspace
• "完全可观测性" 英文翻译 :    complete observability; complete set ufor chemical oxygen demand determinations in seawater
• "可观测性；能观测性" 英文翻译 :    observability

• The error cannot be observed but can be estimated from ols residuals
  不可观测的误差可以通过ols残差进行估计。
• Is measurable directly on rp x r1 but xi is not , and are independent each other
  为只上的可观测随机向量，为不可观测随机向量，又与相互独立
• The visibility of the interference streak on the screen will decline to invisible level
  当宽到一定程度时，屏上干涉条纹的可见度将下降到不可观测的程度。
• The paper derives the quantitative relation to maximum admitted width of the light source used when unobservable circumstance on the screen appears
  推导出了屏上不可观测的情况出现时所用光源的最大允许宽度。
• While teamwork has been becoming one modern scientific productive way , it has a lot of new own problem , namely unobservablity of every membe ’ s effort and distribution of final output
  然而,团队工作也带来了许多新的自身的问题,即各成员的努力付出不可观测性及最终的产出分配等问题。
• It believes that price volatility and trading volume are determined by potential and unobservable information flow whose impact creates both price volatility and trading volume at the same time . information flow is a mixed variable , which can be substituted by two indexes - trading times per day and trading volume
  该理论认为，价格波动与交易量是由潜在的不可观测的信息流共同决定的，信息流的冲击将同时产生交易量和价格波动，信息流即为混合变量，日交易次数和交易量均可以作为信息流的替代指标。
• The third part proves that : if the stuff ' s level of effort a is observable , then ( 1 ) , and explains how to establish the optimum contract under the condition of symmetry information and the characters which optimum contract should have . the fourth part proves : if the stuff ' s level of effort a is n ' t observable , then explains how to establish the optimum contract under the condition of non - symmetry information and the characters which optimum contract should have , gives the reward and punishment measures that the enterprise should take on the employees . the fifth part analyses the influence on the motivation contract form other observable variables such as y , which is irrelevant to the stuff ' s level of effort a by establishing linear contracts s ( m , y ) = a + ( 3 ( m + yy ) , proves if cov ( m , y ) ^ 0 , then we can decrease the agent costs and enhance the accuracy of motivation by putting y into the contract
  第一节通过对经典的马尔可夫转移矩阵的分析，指出了其不具有应用的完备性，并对模型进行了改进；第二节建立了企业基于人力资本理论的人才竞争策略的分析框架；第三节证明了若员工的努力水平a可观测，则有( 1 ) ， ( 2 ) ，从而说明了对称信息条件下最优合同应如何制定以及最优合同应具备的特征；第四节证明了若员工的努力水平a不可观测，则有( 1 ) ， ( 2 )从而说明了非对称信息条件下最优激励合同应如何制定以及最优激励合同应具备的特征，给出了企业奖惩员工的措施；第五节通过建立线性合同s ( m ， y ) = + ( m + y ) ，分析了与员工努力水平a无关的其他可观测变量y对激励合同的影响，证明了当cov ( m ， y ) 0时，将y写入激励合同可减少代理成本，也更能提高激励的准确性；第六节讨论人力资本股份化方法，并给出了一种基于人力资本股权化思想企业对利润的分配模型。
• But in the situation of information asymmetry the activity of managers is unforeseeable . what can be observed is the result of the activity , because the result is decided by the activity and nature state , the manager would attribute the result to the activity and make the shareholder believe the effort by manager as the result is good ; on the other side , the manager would shift the obligation to nature state as the result is bad . then the opportunism of managers is serious , named by " moral risk "
  而在信息不对称的情况下，经营者的行动和自然状态是不可观测的，可观测的只是行动的结果，由于行动结果是由经营者的行动和自然状态共同决定的，当行动结果好时，经营者会把结果的获得全归功为行动，让股东认为经营者努力；当行动结果不好时，经营者则会将责任推卸给自然状态，让股东相信不是自己不努力，从而出现了较为严重的经营者的机会主义行为，即“道德风险” 。
• The braess paradox model is taken as an example to reveal the essence of entropy - maximization and utility - maximization which lies in the unity of the most efficient for the whole and the fairest for local parts and individuals . the internal symmetry of the scaling laws are bring to light based on the dual model of entropy - and utility - maximization . the internal symmetry including translational symmetry , dilation symmetry , and bilateral symmetry originate from relative energy - conservation and information conservation of urban systems reflected by the dual models , and parity conservation of scaling laws
  揭示标度律及其等价模型各种对称性质,发现城市系统具有平移对称、镜像对称和标度对称等内部对称性,这些对称性都对应着城市系统的不可观测量,其本质在于系统内部隐含的守恒律,包括标度变换的奇偶守恒、能量和信息的相对守恒等。