Ownership structure is interior structure of the owner of the company and decides the base of corporate governance , however the discretion of the corporate governance represent on the corporate management performance . at present the ownership of listed companies can largely divide into seven types : shareholdings of soe , common - law - persons shareholdings , interior employee shareholdings , conversion shareholders , a shareholdings , b shareholdings and h shareholders 本文是从质与量两个角度来衡量股权结构与公司绩效之间的关系的,在股权结构的性质上将上市公司划分出国有企业和民营企业,在股权结构的数量上按第一大股东持股比例分为高度分散、适度集中、高度集中三个范围。
The research finding is that no apparent positive relevance exists between the monetary reward of the managers and thee performance of the companies , nor is there much relevance to whether the biggest share holder is the state or not , but there is strong positive relevance to the scale of the company 研究结果表明，我国电子类上市公司高级管理人员的年度货币薪酬与公司经营绩效并不存在显著的正相关关系，与第一大股东是否为国有股也无相关性，但与企业规模存在显著的正相关关系。
This result implies that there exists a problem of internal governance failure in the listed companies , and reducing the state shares fraction is beneficial for us to deal with the problem of internal persons control and to improve the governance of the listed companies . this paper thinks that : ( 1 ) it should be avoided to regulate the owne rship concentration degree of listed companies by administration means 这说明，一股独大并不必然是公司良好治理的障碍；我国上市公司中的确存在内部治理失灵问题，而减持国有股份有助于解决内部人控制；名义上的法人股，并不能对第一大股东形成有效制约，形式上的股权多元化并不一定能促进上市公司的治理。
The results from theory and empirical analysis include : the phenomenon about nbre of private listed companies is more popular ; the ownership restriction can restrain nbre ; when the proportion of the first largest shareholder bellows 50 % , more proportion more nbre ratio ; when the proportion of the first largest shareholder is more than 50 % , the private listed companies perform alignment effects , and the state - owned listed companies perform entrenchment effects 通过理论与实证分析，得出结论：民营上市公司的资金占用现象更为普遍；通过股权制衡作用可以抑制资金占用；当第一大股东持股比例在50 %以下时，持股比例越大，资金占用率越高；当第一大股东持股比例大于50 %时，民营上市公司表现为协同效应，而国有上市公司表现为壕沟效应。
Firstly , ownership concentration should be kept properly in chinese listed companies and the shareholding percentage of large shareholders should be declined to achieve ownership control . secondly , decrease the percentage of state - owned shares by means of selling them to artificial persons . problem of the absence of the available state - owned shareholders should be solved as soon as possible 根据以上结论，本文提出四点建议： ( 1 )保持一定程度的股权集中，同时通过降低第一大股东持股比例形成股权制衡； ( 2 )以法人股东受让的方式减持国有股，解决国有股有效持股主体缺位的问题； ( 3 )提高流通股比例与大力发展机构投资者相结合，引导机构投资者参与公司治理； ( 4 )进行经营者持股的制度创新，充分发挥其激励作用。
On the basis of drawing lessons from the existing research results both at home and abroad , this paper observes the change law of the two financial indexes of nroa and croa from 1997 to 2001 , studies the relations between the locations of listed companies and the m & a performance , between the structure of equity of listed companies and the m & a performance , between the industry nature of the listed companies and the m & a performance , between the type of m & a and the m & a performance , and then draws several conclusions that m & a performance is unsatisfactory on the whole , m & a performance of listed companies in eastern china is superior to that of the counterpart in middle or western china , m & a performance of listed companies that the country or the other corporations hold the most share of the listed companies is unsatisfactory on the whole , the growing or mature listed companies can achieve best m & a performance when they implement the m & a horizontally while the listed companies in declining phase may perform the conglomerate m & a the best 在借鉴国内外已有的研究成果的基础上，本文考察了并购上市公司从1997年到2001年五年时间内净资产收益率和主营利润率两项财务指标的变化规律，研究了并购公司所在的区域与并购绩效、并购公司的股权结构与并购绩效、并购公司的产业性质与并购绩效、并购类型与并购绩效等方面的关系，得出了若干结论： 1 、并购绩效从总体上来说是不理想的； 2 、东部上市公司的并购绩效要优于中部和西部上市公司的并购绩效； 3 、国家股或法人股是第一大股东的上市公司的并购绩效不理想； 4 、处于成长性产业和成熟性产业的上市公司发生横向并购绩效最好，处于衰退性产业的上市公司发生混合并购绩效最好。
