In this section , on the basis of conception of financial performance evaluation and the characteristics of non - profit organization , we know the conception and feature of the financial performance evaluation of non - profit organization , besides , we also introduce some relevant theory , like principal - agency theory and then management theory , and how to draw on the experience of the financial performance evaluation theory of profit organization 第二部分,非营利组织财务绩效评价的相关概念与理论基础。在这一部分中,从财务绩效的概念和非营利组织的特征出发,明确了非营利组织财务绩效的概念、特征,介绍了与非营利组织财务绩效评价研究相关的委托代理理论、权变管理理论,在此基础上对非营利组织如何借鉴营利性组织的财务绩效评价理论作了阐述。
Based on the trust law , the agency theory , the frame of internal restrictive structure and the theory of institutional economics , using the comparative methodology , this thesis discussed four internal restrictive modes , whose representative nation is japan , germany , u . k . and india . the author compared and analyzed the rules , the operation , the advantage and disadvantage of each mode , and the background reasons in each representative nation . considering the realism environment of our fund industry , the author proposed and designed to use the independent trustees ’ mode for reference to reform our internal restrictive and governance structure of contractual fund 本文在信托理论、委托代理理论、内部约束模式理论和制度经济学相关理论的基础上,利用比较分析的方法,对比研究了以日本、德国、英国、印度为代表的四种契约型基金内部约束模式的运作、优劣以及在各典型国家取得成功的背景原因,并从我国基金业现实不足的深层次原因和客观限制环境出发,提出借鉴独立受托理论的制度安排,建立以受托委员会为核心的契约型基金约束模式的改革建议和具体的运作设想。
After analyzing systematically such factories as the necessity , the meaning , the characters and the influence of the financial supervision and control system of the business groups , a framework of it has built up . then expounds the theoretical foundation from the two respects of the agency theory and utility analyzing 对集团财务监控的必要性、涵义、特点及影响因素等进行系统剖析，构建了一个企业集团财务监控体系的框架；同时从委托代理理论和效用分析两个方面对企业集团财务监控的理论基础加以全面阐述。
It takes agency theory as its premise , human resource property right as its core , and modern distribution theory and risk theory as its foundation . its basic idea is to give high - level managers headed by chief executive officer the right to purchase common stocks of the company at a certain price and time in the future . through this equity system , it ' s expected to inspirit organizations " management in the long run , avoid operators " short - term behavior , and thus reduce agency cost , improve organizations " management structure , and promote the stability of management , so that both constituents ( stake holders ) and vicegerents " ( operators ) targets of gaining profit will be realized finally 其本质是对经营者的一种薪酬安排；它以代理理论为前提，以人力资本产权理论为核心，以现代分配理论和风险理论为基础；其基本内容是给予公司内以首席执行官为首的高级管理人员在未来某特定的时间按某一固定价格购买本公司普通股的权力；通过这种机制希望对公司管理层起到长期激励的作用，避免经营者的短期行为，从而减少代理成本，改善企业的治理结构，促进稳健经营，最终实现委托者(股东)和受托者(经营者)双赢的目的；它是把期权理论应用于现代激励机制的一种制度创新，比较符合市场经济条件下企业经营者的价值取向和企业发展的战略要求。
This part traces back to the root of agency from which the agency being created and gives a comparison to " the separatism " under the civil law tradition and " the equalization " under the common law tradition of the agency theory , and it reveals the impact of the two theories to the legislation under the different systems 二、国际代理法律冲突产生的原因及其表现不同国家的代理制度，各有其不同的理论基础。总体上讲，大陆法系国家以“区别论”作为其代理制度的理论基础，而英美法系国家则以“等同论”作为其代理制度的理论基础。
Because of the different understanding and legislation of agency under the two legal systems , the legal conflicts of agency involving foreign elements create . through comparative studies of agency theories and legislation , this dissertation analyses and discusses the rules speculated in governing domestic laws and international conventions on agency . the author intends to put forward some suggestions on perfecting the legislation of china on the applicable law on agency 本文采取比较研究的方法，通过对不同国家的代理制度和有关代理的国际条约的比较和分析，阐述了国际代理的法律冲突和法律适用制度，并在此基础上，对完善我国的国际(涉外)代理法律适用规则提出了相应的建议。
Agency is designed on behalf of the principal , while the apparent agency breaks free from the traditional agency theory in which the authority keeps a restraint on the agent ' s action and in order to protect the third party acting in good faith . the law requires the principal to bear the legal liability resulting from the action of the unauthorized agent 而表见代理制度打破了传统代理理论中代理权对代理人行为的约束，在第三人有正当理由相信代理权授予外观的情况下，为了保护善意第三人的利益，法律强使被代理人承担无权代理人行为的后果。
With the assumption of berk - means model being used in most modem companies and two economics theories , humanity hypothesis and agency theory , this thesis deduced that the potential abuse of manager ' s power must be limited and inhibited by a power - balanced system through a rational way . and then this chapter has disserted the legal theory basis of manager system from legal aspect , that is , applying the answer to why the manager post is necessary for a company and what kind of manager is available 本文以相关经济学理论为切入点，明确现代公司多为伯利?米恩斯模式，并以经济学上的人性假设理论和代理理论为基点，推导出在经理问题上必须以合理的权力制衡机制对抗潜在的权力滥用，从法律角度论述了公司经理制度的法理基础，即口答公司为什么需要经理以及需要什么样的经理这两个问题。
