It can be seen that the way that rebuilding the soe as the stock companies and then listing can not change the soe into real modern enterprise . sbc still exists in state - owned listed companies 由此可见，通过股份制改造上市并没有使国有企业成为真正的现代企业，国有上市公司仍然存在软预算约束。
This present thesis studies the above - mentioned problems by analyzing the characteristics of financial behavioral of state - owned listed companies and measure the degree of soft budget constraint ( sbc ) 本文从国有上市公司融资行为的特征这一角度出发，以预算约束的软硬程度做标准，对这个问题进行深入剖析。
On the other hand , according to the demonstration , listing the state - owned banks is not a smooth way , and after listing the state - owned banks will probably face the problem of sbc and bad assets 其次，国有银行上市并非坦途大道，国有银行上市后仍可能面临软预算约束，不良资产问题仍可能困扰国有上市银行。
The pursuit of the whole society for the risk assets , transition style of economic increase , budget restrain theory and contacts theory offer a strong motive power and theoretical foundation for the birth of 社会对风险资产的追求、经济增长方式的转变、预算约束理论和契约理论为创业投资的产生提供了原动力和理论基础。
They are : reinforce government budget restriction ; consummate the system of public finance of education ; add the sources of income of public finance of education ; reform the means of education grants ; improve the administration of education expenditure 主要包括：强化政府预算约束；完善教育财政体制；拓宽教育财政的收入来源；改进教育拨款方式；提高教育财政管理效率。
The sbc in the sectors of state - owned economy not only makes soe lack of competition promoting and be deficient , but also lead to a great number of non - performing bank loans , which may cause tremendous risk of finance crisis in the national economy 国有经济部门的软预算约束不但使国有企业缺乏竞争激励、效率低下，而且造成了大量的银行不良资产，给国家经济体系带来巨大的金融危机风险。
The ultimate reason is that sate - owned listed companies are none the less struck by sbc , and the state - owned banks do not realize commercialization . the ownership relation among " listed companies - - state - owned banks - - government " keeps unchanged 其根本原因在于国有上市公司融资依然存在软预算约束，我国国有银行尚未真正实现商业化， “上市公司? ?国有银行? ?政府”之间依然保持着剪不断理还乱的所属关系。
The author focuses on the optimization of economic transition in china from the view of soft budget constraint ( sbc ) . firstly , the author introduces the origin , development of sbc and significance of research on it briefly in chapter 1 and introduces four representative theories of factor analysis of sbc systematically in chapter 2 首先在第1章中简要介绍了软预算约束的起源、发展及研究软预算约束的理论意义和实际意义，并在第2章中系统介绍了四种有代表性的软预算约束成因分析理论。
The paper exploits the relationship between utility and budget control in microeconomics and establishes a mathematical model to find the equilibrium between effectiveness and safety , so as to set a reasonable model for safe investment , efficiently segment the limited input in different aspects , and provide guidance for operation 论文运用微观经济学有关效用与预算约束之间的关系，建立数学模型，在经济性与安全性之间找到平衡点，从而确定合理的安全投资规模，并将有限的投入合理地在各个方面分配,指导实际生产。
Practices of venture capital in china have shown : 1 ) venture capital industrial is lack of fund , fine system , preferential polices and laws , medium - organization and the capital market such as ipo ( initial public offering ) and the second - board share market where investors can sale the shares . that is to say , the development of venture capital industrial in china lacks of preferential macro - scope environment . so the unfit government behavior is the mam restrictive factor . 2 ) venture capital industrial is wholly controlled and practiced by the government , which is the main investor of venture capital organization , while there is not outstanding achievement both theory and practice have shown : venture capital industrial will not succeed if government is the main investor for a long time 具体体现为： ( 1 )相当多的风险投资机构运作困难，效益低下，大多数都违背了设立的初衷； ( 2 )风险投资资金缺乏，来源单一，总量不足； ( 3 )风险投资者的利益得不到保护，导致投资者积极性不高，加剧了风险资本的匮乏； ( 4 )风险投资在投资、融资和实现回报等各个环节的障碍很多，无法实现良性循环，造成风险投资的成本和风险过高，收益偏低； ( 5 )风险投资发展中政企不分，缺乏现代企业制度中的激励机制和硬预算约束机制，投资成功率低。
