基金持有人

• Laws of different countries stipulate that fund managers bear fiduciary duty to fund holders to restrict this power , based on which a comparatively more scientific system protecting investors " benefits has been set up
  各国法制均规定基金管理人对基金持有人负有信赖义务以限制其权力，并据此构建更为科学的投资者利益保护机制。
• It really means a lot if investors continue to hold the share when the closed - end fund changes to open - end fund automatically as investors do not need to pay the 1 . 5 % subscription fee
  对于投资者来讲，封闭式基金的持有人如果继续持有，自动转为将来的开放式基金持有人之后，等于免费认购了新的开放式基金，而没有付出1 . 5 %的认购费用。
• A broader understanding of fund governance is a series of legal system arrangements designated to eliminate the moral risk that stems from the proxy - agent conflicts . its essence is the maximum protection over the interests of fund ownership
  对其较为宽泛的理解是消除由于委托代理冲突而产生的道德风险的一系列法律制度安排,其本质是最大限度的保护基金持有人利益。
• That means the guarantee will not apply and holders of the fund are fully exposed to fluctuations in the value of the assets of the underlying fund . for addition information , please refer to the explanatory memorandum of the bea ( mpf ) master trust scheme
  这表示保证不会适用，而基金持有人将完全受到构成该基础基金之资产的波动所影响，如须更多有关资料，请参阅有关的销售说明书。
• The entities of interests enclosed in the system mainly are fund holders ; fund managers and fund trustees , agent relationship and contract are the main connection among them , also the thread in risk hedge and performance appraisal of investment funds
  其涉及的利益主体主要有基金持有人、基金管理人和墓金托管人，委托代理关系和契约是连接它们的主要纽带，也是贯穿投资基金风险防范和绩效评价研究的主线。
• Several problems that need to be concerned are discussed in section six . because the open - ended fund can overcome the intrinsic drawbacks of the close - ended fund , and can better ensure the benefit of the investors , the open - ended fund should be further developed in china
  从前面的上章分析口i以看出，山于汗放式基金克服了封闭式基金所固有的制度缺陷，能更好地保护基金持有人的利益，所以我国应该大力发展开放式基金。
• Lessons can be learnt from american experience in working out strict rules and laws to prevent against related party transaction in investment funds , especially in areas like defining main bodies of related parties , classified regulation , improving internal control system , disclosure and law suit rights of unit trust holders
  我国应借鉴美国的经验，对投资基金的关联交易采取严格禁止的立法政策，并从合理界定关联交易的主体、对关联交易实行分类监管、完善投资基金的内部约束机制、信息披露制度、赋予基金持有人诉权等方面完善我国证券投资基金关联交易的法律规范体系。
• It correlates to defending the investors " benefits that how to define trust contract correctly . based on the comparatively studying different countries " contract structure of investing fund , this chapter dissects the loopholes and drawbacks of chinese existing contract structure of investing fund , and suggests taking japanese model as reference to import trust system to create a unit trust contract , then putting fund holder , fund manager and fund custodian into one trust contract
  在比较分析各国投资基金契约结构的设置后，本部分对我国现行投资基金结构的缺陷逐一剖析，揭示了我国投资基金将投资者排斥出基金契约之外的不合理性，以及基金结构的非信托性，建议以日本“一元制”基金契约结构为圭臬，引入信托机制，将我国投资基金契约规定为一个信托契约，并把基金持有人、基金管理人和基金托管人纳入一个信托契约当中。
• In addition , however , since the committee contains representatives from institutions which are not central banks , the decisions it takes carry the commitment of many national authorities outside the central banking fraternity . one important objective of the committee s work has been to close gaps in international supervisory coverage in pursuit of two basic principles : that no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision ; and that supervision should be adequate
  第二种解决方案在中国既存的公司法体制下可能易于操作一些，即通过向所管理的基金持有人发行一种特殊种类的管理公司的股票，并且在管理公司创制股票种类的章程中规定出独立董事的作用，从而使该机制得以实施。
• In part in , the author studies the obligation - blinding mechanism to the trustees , which is the core of governance structure of fund , pointing out that one of the main reason for the serious abnormality of current funds is the lacking of duty performance of the trustees . though it is hand to set up an effective obligation - binding mechanism to the trustees under the chinese current legal system , we can learn from britain and the u ? s ? a . in part iv , the author studies the mechanism of balance inside the governance structure of funds , that is the supervision mechanism of trustors and the balance mechanism of fund - holders , then puts forward that strengthening the balance mechanism inside the funds is an important step to establish an effective governance structure of found ; further more , to deal with the problems in the two mechanisms the author makes some suggestion about perfecting the mechanism of balance inside the fund in china
  本文共分四个部分，第一部分通过对信托制基金本质和特点的分析，指出了架构信托制基金治理结构的必要性，并阐述了架构我国基金治理结构应遵循的基本原则；第二部分对架构信托制基金治理结构的基础，也就是信托制基金的组织结构进行了研究，认为我国基金组织结构存在较大缺陷，但现存基金组织结构的立法模式也不适宜我国照搬照抄，而自益信托、共同信托才是我国信托制基金组织结构的应然选择；第三部分对基金治理结构的核心问题，即基金管理人的义务约束机制进行了研究，指出：我国目前存在的基金行为异化现象严重的主要根源之一就是基金管理人义务的缺失；但在我国现行法律制度框架内无法架构起有效规制管理人的义务机制，而英美法对基金管理人的受信人义务的规定值得我们借鉴；第四部分对基金治理结构的内部监控机制，即基金托管人的监督机制和基金持有人的制衡机制进行了研究，指出：强化基金内部监控机制是架构有效的基金治理结构的重要一环；并针对我国这方面机制存在的问题提出了完善我国基金内部监控机制的建议。