However , with the controling share being kept in the hands of state government or institutional shareholders , independent directors find that they are actually underplayed roles in boardrooms and their confined atonomy and monitoring function can not stop some majority stockholders from engaging in self - interest serving and infringing minority stokholders ’ interests 中国上市公司的国家股和法人股占据了绝大份额,而占绝对控股权的大股东就拥有了对公司的绝对控制权,独立董事在董事会中的制衡作用却收效甚微,这就为大股东谋求不正当利益提供了便利。
The china ' s listing companies " common shares can be divided into tradable shares and un - tradable shares , and most of controlling shareholders hold state - owned share and legal person shares that both are un - tradable . the distinction between shares made different shareholders has different value - orientation . due to " agent shareholder " actually controlled the listing companies , they made the companies " objective deviated from maximizing corporate value - added to maximizing their own interests 中国上市公司的股份分为流通股和未流通股两部分，而占控股地位的绝大部分是未流通的国家股和法人股，股权结构的人为分割造成“同股、同权、同利”基础的丧失，利益的差别导致未流通股股东和流通股股东各自追求不同的价值目标。
Maybe that is one reason that managers are not threatened by the mechanism of corporate governance such as merging and taking over . furthermore , because of different goals between the state and firms , state - owned shares can not act as a good supervisor in corporate governance . meanwhile , chinese inefficient capital and product markets have failed to perform as an outside supervisor 非全流通的股权结构使得公司治理机制中的购并机制和代理权竞争机制难以发挥有效作用，同时，国家股股东行政化使得大股东不能有效行使对经理们的监督与激励，因此产生了严重的“内部人控制”的问题。
First of all , it introduces the definitions , constitutions and characteristics of state - owned share and legal - entity - held share , lists the differences between listed companies and non - listed companies , and analyses the defects in management structure of chinese listed companies : 1 . not having gone through the severe test of a market economy , chinese listed companies have been suffering from a " congenital malformation " and a lopsided development since establishment 首先对国家股与法人股的定义、形成与特征作了相关介绍；接着对我国上市公司股权结构现状进行了分析描述，最后对中国上市公司治理结构的缺陷理论分析： 1 、上市公司普遍缺乏市场经济的洗礼，具有明显的“先天不足” 。
The classification and non - currency of the state stocks and artificial person ' s stocks are the unique equity ownership structure phenomena of chinese capital market , which resulting in the imperfection of the artificial person management system and " inter - persons control " , and making the state - owned stocks lessening necessary 国家股、法人股的分类与不流通是我国资本市场的特有股权结构现象，它所导致的上市公司法人治理结构不完善和“内部人控制”等诸多问题使国有股减持成为必要。
Acquiring a listed company by agreement can be defined as follows : in order to get the control of a listed company , an investor tries to buy enough shares of the target company by private agreement from outside of the stock exchanges . the present share structure of the listed companies in china is quite different from other countries as in which the state - owned shares are no doubt in the controlling position , which contributes to the fact of acquisition by agreement being the mainly acquisition form in china today 上市公司协议收购是指投资者为了取得对于某上市公司的控制权，而在证券集中交易场所以外通过私下协议的方式受让该上市公司股份的行为。当前我国上市公司股权结构中国有股(包括国家股和国有法人股)处于控股地位，这使得协议收购成为我国目前上市公司收购的主要形式。
We argue that this kind of ownership transfer improve the mechanisms of corporate governance , which includes rebuilding the board of directors , creating large shareholders , constraining agents and supervising insiders . at last , the case of zhengzhoubaiwen proves our opinion again . the transfer of state - owned shares ( baiwen corporation ) to corporate shares ( sanlian corporation ) improved the mechanism of corporate governance , and enhanced the corporation value 最后，结合“郑州百文”的案例，我们分析在其股权结构的优化过程中，国家股向法人股转让后对大股东再造、董事会的重构以及对代理人监督和激励机制的作用发挥效果，认为“郑州百文”国家股转让给法人股是有利于其治理结构的完善，而且也提高了企业的绩效，因此进一步验证本文提出的国家股向法人股转让是有利于公司治理结构完善的观点。
So , author draws conclusions : shares structure of firm in share market is related to achievement of firm , and concentration degree of shares structure has negative relation with achievement of firm . that is to say : the higher concentration degree of shares structure is , the worse achievement of firm is ; the bigger proportion of corporation share is , the better achievement of firm is ; public share has influence a little on achievement of firm 因此，得出以下结论：上市公司股权结构与公司业绩存在相关关系，并且股权集中度与公司业绩负相关，即在中国国家股“一股独大”的现状下，股权集中度越高，公司业绩越差；法人股所占比例越大，公司业绩越好；公众股对业绩基本没有影响。
Part two introduces the theory of panel data . the basic form of panel data is : yi t = it + xi t it + uit , i = 1 , 2 , … , n ; t = 1 , 2 , … , t panel data is used for describing the instance of swatch in a collectivity in some time , and observing every unit in swatch multi - scale . basing on the different hypothesis of ui , panel data has fixed effect model and random effect model , if ui is a unit constant ( corresponding to the dummy variable of 基于分析结果,本文给出了改革我国公司治理结构的若干建议: ( 1 )股权性质方面,培育有效的国家股持股主体; ( 2 )股权结构方面,逐渐调整股权结构,减少第一大股东持股比例,增加除第一大股东以外的大股东的股权集中度; ( 3 )董事会方面,采取奇数型董事会规模,并完善独立董事的生成机制; ( 4 )激励制度方面,应加大董事及总经理的持股比例。
Due to the special equity structure in china , company governance does n ' t pay attention to protect the investors , so the empirical results show as follows : ( l ) it exists the negative relation between the proportion of state - owned stocks and corporate performance ; it does n ' t exists the remarkable relation between the proportion of circulation stocks and corporate performance ; the function of corporation in company governance depends on its owned stocks . ( 2 ) the performance of equity - scattered company is superior to that of equity - gathered company , the performance of corporation - gathered company is superior to that of state company . ( 3 ) in the protective industries , the degree of equity d oes n ' t influence the performance , state - owned stocks play a leading role , there is a negative relation between the proportion of its stocks and croa , but there is n ' t a remarkable negative relation between the proportion of its stocks and roe ; in non - protective industries , the performance of equity - scattered company is superior to that of equity - gathered company , and the proportion of corporation stocks rise , the influence of proportion on corporate performance depends on its owned stocks . finally , it gives some reasonable suggestions and discusses the limits of research 由于在我国特殊的股权结构下，公司治理对投资者缺乏保护，实证结果表现为： ( 1 )国家股股东持股比例与公司绩效存在负向关系；流通股股东持股比例与公司绩效之间不存在显著的关系；法人股股东在公司治理中的作用依持股水平而定； ( 2 )股权分散公司的绩效优于股权集中公司，法人集中公司的绩效优于国有集中公司； ( 3 )在保护性行业，股权集中程度对绩效的影响不显著，国家股占主导地位，其持股比例与绩效指标croa存在负向关系，与绩效指标roe存在不显著负向关系；在非保护性行业，股权分散公司的绩效优于股权集中公司，法人股比例上升，其持股比例对公司绩效的影响依持股水平而定。最后，提出相应的政策建议并讨论了研究的局限性。
