duopoly造句

• In this paper , we have built game models on monopoly market and duopoly market to analyze different strategies of service providers and their influence
  本文通过建立电信服务质量的垄断企业模型和双寡头竞争模型，分析了电信运营商质量竞争的策略选择及其影响。
• This paper , in a duopoly market , investigates the impact of strategic delegation behaviors of on the optimal licensing policy for the licensor under auction mechanism
  摘要本文在双寡头垄断的市场中，考察了拍卖许可制度下企业所有者的策略性授权行为对技术专利持有者的最优许可政策的影响。
• In this paper , we investigate location - then - price game of duopoly under uncertain consumer tastes and discuss firms ' location and price decisions and product differentiation
  摘要本文通过建立在企业对消费者偏好信息不确定情形下，双寡头企业动态定位、定价博弈模型，研究企业的定位策略、定价策略以及产品差异化问题。
• By analyzing the characterizes of the software industry and market , we build an asymmetric duopoly model with production differentiation and network externality to study the competitive equilibrium state and it ’ s shift
  通过对产业特征和市场特点的研究,我们建立了在具有网络外部性效应情况下的一个双寡头非对称差异化竞争模型来研究两种制度竞争的均衡状态和均衡变动情况。
• In this paper , the authors discuss water supply enterprises ' cooperative and non - cooperative action of innovation in duopoly market with game theory , and also interpret the microcosmic game mechanism which have explained whether innovation would occur
  摘要用博弈论的方法从双寡头市场的角度探讨了供水企业在进行节水灌溉设施技术创新活动中的合作与不合作行为，分析了在这样的市场结构中节水灌溉设施技术创新的微观博弈机制。
• On the basis of analysis of characteristics of locomotive corporations , it improves the classical game model - - - - cournot duopoly , bertrand duopoly , stackelberg duopoly , combines the three models , and establishes the association modes of locomotive corporations
  本文在分析龙头企业特点的基础上,把经典的博弈模型一古诺寡头模型和贝特兰德寡头模型、斯塔克博格寡头模型结合起来并加以改进,建立了龙头企业之间联盟的方式。
• Through introducing the investment level between the crm ( customer relationship management ) and the scm ( supply chain management ) , the e - business strategy , which includes balancing the status of both the crm and the scm , was analyzed under both monopoly and duopoly markets
  通过简化客户关系管理和供应链管理对企业的经济影响，同时考虑企业对电子商务战略的投资水平，分析垄断企业的电子商务战略和2个竞争企业在不同成本结构的情况下电子商务战略的优化问题。
• This paper examines the relationship between financial decisions and pricing strategy in oligopoly . assuming a duopoly market structure , when firms raise prices they initially realize higher profits , but lower market shares , which in turn implies lower profits in the future
  论文提出一个两阶段双寡头垄断竞争模型：第一阶段，公司在价格的基础上争夺市场份额；第二阶段，公司利润由第一阶段形成的市场份额决定，并受到第一阶段结束时公司财务状况的影响。
• We presented a model with duopoly upstream and monopolistic downstream industry chains , analyzed the analysis profits and prices of models between vertical integration and vertical separation , and also discussed the background and condition of vertical separation of microcomputer cpu and mobile telecom chipset industries
  构建了上游为双寡头结构、下游为多家企业的产业链模型，并对纵向一体化和纵向拆分两种模式的利润和价格进行了分析和比较，同时对纵向拆分的技术和市场背景及内外条件作了进一步的探讨。
• Using some theories in microeconomic , game theory and information economics , this paper qualitatively analyzes the theoretical causes of stock market bubble and points out that asymmetric information , irrational investing behavior , contradiction between demand and supply as well as duopoly are major factors that result stock market bubble
  本论文运用西方经济学、博弈论及信息经济学理论，定性分析了股市泡沫生成的一般性理论原因，指出信息不对称、非理性投资行为、需求矛盾和寡头垄断是产生股市泡沫的几个重要因素。
• But my focus was specially laid on the decision - making of investment under uncertainty and with competition , i first . extend the basic model of dixit & pindyck ' s by allowing the relevant parameter to be a random variable , then proposed an numerical example to show how to solve this model , i gave the algorithm and did the comparative static analysis , finally i developed a model of duopoly under uncertainty , considering the competition between the firms explicitly , using roa , i calculated the two firm ' s values respectively when they take different roles - to be leader or follower , and then checked the possible equilibriums
  本文的重点是考察在同时存在不确定性和竞争的情况下，如何用实物期权的理论估算投资项目的价值，为此，文中发展了两个模型，第一个模型是对dixit & pindyck的模型的扩展，它通过一个相关的随机变量来考察竞争对项目价值的影响，但没有考虑企业间的相互博弈，文中给出了一个例子详细地说明了该模型的求解并做了敏感性分析；第二个模型是一个不确定情况下的双寡头模型，文中给出了用实物期权方法计算的两企业在处于领导者和跟随者两种不同境况时的价值，并将企业间的相互博弈考虑在内，考察了可能的均衡状态。